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The paper presents a simple three-region, two-sector general equilibrium model that is used for analysing the 
effect of regional tax policies. The model includes exogenous asymmetry in terms of transport costs as well as a 
vertical industry structure that can account for endogenous location development in order to distinguish between 
the effect of ‘first nature’ and ‘second nature’ on the required subsidy for meeting a population policy target.    
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One of the great merits of ‘new economic geography’ (NEG) models is the ability to explain 
core periphery structures endogenously through the economic development (‘second nature’) 
of location rather than merely assuming core periphery structures based on exogenous 
attributes (‘first nature’). However, the enthusiasm may have gone too far in disconnecting 
first and second nature so that the inherent core periphery characteristic of many exogenous 
attributes is swept under the carpet. Let me give an example: first nature is in many two-
region models represented by (iceberg) transport costs. With equal transport costs either way, 
there are two regions defined by first nature, but there is not a first nature core and periphery. 
In applied work it would be nice to allow both first nature exogenous core periphery attributes 
and second nature endogenous core periphery developments to interact. A simple way to 
allow first nature asymmetry is to add a third region, all three regions located along a line 
with transport costs depending on distance. Although the analysis may be concentrated to 
only two of these regions, trade linkages to the third region makes one of them more 
advantageous than the other in terms of first nature location. In this paper, a simple three 
region general equilibrium model along these lines is presented. The second nature is 
introduced through a vertical linkage between an upstream sector producing intermediates 
under increasing returns for a domestic downstream sector producing consumer goods under 
constant returns for domestic use and export.  
 
The model is applied to analyze two alternative policies. The first policy is a payroll subsidy 
in one of the first nature peripheral regions financed by a payroll tax in the first nature core 
region. We may think of these two regions as part of one country and the remaining region as 
the world outside so that the policy is a national regional policy. The second policy is laissez-
faire, possibly replacing the first because the world outside make complaints about trade 
distorting state aid.  
 
The paper is organised in 5 sections. The model without policy instruments is presented in 
Section 2. The ‘policy on’ situation is described in Section 3. The two are compared in 
Section 4 under the heading ‘Policy performance’ and Section 5 concludes. The 
microeconomic foundations as well as details on the full model are relegated to Appendix A 




2. The model 
 
We have three regions: the assisted region, the North n, the assisting region, the South s, and 
the world outside. Transport costs between n and the world is higher than either between n 
and s or s and the world because of distance and different accessibility costs. Distance is 
leading to a geographical disadvantage for n compared to s since higher transport costs imply 
higher living costs, leading to lower real wage or higher labour costs.  
 
In each of the regions there is an economic base sector, the B sector, and a non-basic sector, 
the A sector. To simplify, I assume that the B sector produces only final goods, while the A 
sector only produces intermediates. Hence, we have a vertical industry structure with the B 
sector downstream and the A sector upstream. Following orthodox trade theory, we abstract 
from interregional trade in intermediates so only final goods are tradable. Technology is 
assumed identical in the three regions.  
 
The B sector downstream produces by means of B skilled labour and intermediates from the A 
sector upstream. The consumers distinguish the products from the B sectors of the three 
regions by origin only.1 The firms downstream are price takers in the output market and use a 
constant to scale technology. In equilibrium no firms earn profits due to free entry. Market 
prices are determined by equating demand and supply. In order to abstract from currency 
issues, all regions are treated as if they had a common currency.  
 
The A sector upstream produces differentiated intermediates by means of a single input called 
A skilled labour. Due to fixed set up costs there are internal increasing returns to scale. The 
market structure is monopolistic competition. Specialization through the number of 
intermediate inputs is endogenous and acts as an agglomeration (centripetal) force. The larger 
the A sector, the more productive is the B sector of the region.2  
 
                                                          
1 This is essentially the Armington (1969) assumption. 
2 An alternative, considered by Skott and Roos (1997), is a fixed number of intermediate inputs. 
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Both B skilled and A skilled labour is mobile between n and s. Following the new economic 
geography tradition, spatial equilibrium is simply obtained when the real wage of labour is the 
same in both regions.3  
 
Under laissez faire the model can essentially be summarized by four simple equations where 
the variables are relative variables expressing the value in the North relative to the South: 
1=lw             (1) 
pw=             (2) 
ml =             (3) 
)1(13/ αβαατ −−−−= lwp           (4) 
Here  is the relative downstream producer wage, l and m are the ratios of labour North to 
South downstream (l) and upstream (m), and is the relative consumer price level. Greek 
letters denote parameters: 
w
p
α is characterizing the taste for home made goods ( / (1 )α α−  is 
the ratio of home made goods to foreign goods), β  is characterizing the strength of the 
vertical linkage, andτ is the ratio of short distance (the distance between North and South or 
South and the world) to long distance (the distance between North and the world) iceberg 
transport costs.  
 
The reduced form model (1) - (4) follows from the full model presented in Appendix B under 
the following assumptions: there are no taxes and there is full labour mobility between the 
North and the South in both the upstream and the downstream sectors (recall that labour is 
sector specific).  We will also throughout the paper restrict attention to the situation where 
there is an exogenous home market effect in the sense that the market share for home made 
goods is at least as large as the market share for imports from one of the outside regions.  
 
Equation (1) essentially follows from market clearing in all downstream markets, equation (2) 
is the condition for B-skilled labour mobility equilibrium (downstream) and  equation (3) that 
for A-skilled (upstream), and equation (4) gives the relative consumer price level where we 
have taken advantage of the restriction imposed ny (3) in order to economize on parameters.  
 
                                                          
3 This need not be interpreted in a literal sense, but may be regarded as a reduced form for more sophisticated 
behaviour. As shown by Baldwin (2001), replacing myopic with forward looking behaviour in the standard 
core-periphery model (Fujita et al., 1999) does not imply that the qualitative behaviour of that model changes.  
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The model is easily solved for w, p, l and m: 
( ) ααβ
α
τ −−== )1(3/1pw  
( ) )1(3/1 αβα
α
τ −−== ml  
For the model to be well behaved in the sense of generating a higher equilibrium population 
in the South (advantaged through lower transport costs), we must impose / (1 )α α− > β .  We 
observe that the restriction is most easily fulfilled when the ratio of home made goods to 
imported goods is large. For fixed τ we have / 0l α∂ ∂ >  and /l 0β∂ ∂ < . Hence, an increase 
in α (weaker preferences for home made goods) acts as a centrifugal force spreading 
population more equally, whereas an increase in β  (higher cost share for intermediates 
downstream or rising markup over input price upstream) makes the second nature effect 
through the vertical linkage stronger and acts as a centripetal force concentrating population 
in the core. Hence, trade linkages and vertical linkages have opposite effects in the model.   
We may also note that the equilibrium population distribution implies almost total 
depopulation of the North if β  should ever approach the upper limit / (1 )α α− . 
 
It may be instructive to express relative real wage in terms of the downstream labour ratio 
(also equal to the upstream labour ratio by equation (3) and therefore also the population 
ratio).  Using equation (1) and (4), we obtain 
/3 (1 )/w p lα β α ατ − −=  
 In equilibrium the ratio is equal to one in accordance with equation (2). Figure 1 illustrates 
the equilibrium for different parameter values. Along the horizontal line the real wage is equal 
in North and South. The down-sloping curves represent relative real wage as a function of the 
labour ratio. In Panel a relative distance is increasing, leading to a uniform downward shift in 
the wage curve as the intercept /3ατ  becomes smaller when τ falls (the dashed curve). In 
Panel b the vertical linkage becomes stronger, again leading to a downward shift as the slope 
becomes flatter when β  goes up. In Panel c there is a positive shift in preferences for home 
made goods and services that lead to the shift in the wage curve as the intercept goes up and 
the slope becomes flatter at the same time.  
 
 





Panel a. Increasing relative distance (τ down) 
 
 
Panel b. Stronger vertical linkage ( β up) 
 
 
Panel c. Increasing preferences for home mades (α down) 
 
Figure 1. Equilibrium 
Note: The horizontal line represents the equilibrium relative real wage, /w p 1= . The s
represents the wage equation, /3 (1 )/w p lα β α ατ − −= , before (after) the parameter change.





Please, observe that as short distance transport costs fall relative to long distance costs, the 
crossing that indicates equilibrium is moved to the right, ultimately crossing for l equal to one 
when there is no transport cost asymmetry left. Hence, when space is neutral, downstream 
labour is equally split between regions and, by implication, populations too. When space is 
non-neutral, less people reside in the disadvantaged region.  
 
Unlike the traditional core-periphery model (Krugman, 1991, Fujita et al., 1999), the present 
model gives a unique equilibrium level for the regional population distribution. However, the 
actual distribution will shift for a change in parameter values as illustrated in Figure 1. A fall 
in short distance to long distance transport costs, suggested as a stylized fact by Hummels 
(1999), will move the equilibrium towards the symmetric distribution. So will an increase in 
the share of imported goods (implied by a higherα ), that may also be viewed as a stylized 
fact of globalization. A stronger vertical linkage on the other hand, also possibly a stylized 
fact, will move the distribution in the other direction. Hence, a similar reduction in short 
distance to long distance transport costs could well have very different effects in different 
economies depending on industry structure and openness as measured by trade statistics. Or 
economies characterized by differences in relative distance, could well be very differently 
affected by changes in the vertical structure or trade. If these changes are deliberately brought 
about through public policy, effective policy design within the model must obviously take the 
differences between different areas into account since one size will not fit all, here just as in 
the real world. 
 
 
3. Policy on 
 
Assume now that we consider a regional policy with the aim to balance the first nature 
disadvantage reflected in higher transport costs so that population becomes the same in the 
North and the South. The model then has to be slightly changed, 
[ ] sn ttw /)1(1/)1(1 αα −−=−−         (5) 
[ ] sn ttw /111/1 −=−           (6) 
sn ttpw /=            (7) 
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αατ −−= 13/ wp            (8) 
The new symbols are  and  for the payroll tax factors in the North and the South (recall 
that if  t  is the tax rate, 1  is defined as the tax factor). Observe that l and n no longer are 




The reduced form model (5) - (8) follows from the full model presented in Appendix B under 
the following assumptions: the tax rate is not differentiated across sectors and the policy 
instrument is used to exactly balance the first order asymmetry between the North and the 
South so that population is the same, and there is full labour mobility between the North and 
the South. Equation (5) is equivalent to equation  (1) in the model without policy instruments, 
equation (2) ensures that subsidies are balanced by taxes, equation (3) is the condition for 
labour mobility equilibrium, and equation (4) gives the relative consumer price level.  
 
The model given by the four equations can in principle be solved for , ,  and w p nt st .  
With symmetric market shares ( 1=α ), the solution is particularly simple. From (1) it follows 
that . Substituting in the other equations and solving, we get   ,1=w 3/1−= τp
1/31
2n





=  The solution for  and nt st  is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Although it seems reasonable to threat transport costs as exogenous, it turns out to be more 
convenient in the general case to let τ be endogenous along with ,   and w p st , and solve 
conditional on . Doing this for the symmetric case, we obtain nt ( )312 −= ntτ , )12/(1 −= ntp  





Figure 2. Compensating subsidy 
Note: payroll tax factor in the South (above the unit line) and the North (below). 
 
The general solution is just a little more complicated. The solution for , w p , st  and 




























































tt      (12) 
We observe that the value for α places a lower bound on  for the model to be well 
specified. The restriction 
nt
2/1 α−>nt  ensures that p is positive. When p is positive, so is w, 
and  is at least unity. But then  and it follows that  and . For st 1nt ≤ 1p ≥ 1p w≥ ≥ 1=α  the 
restriction is fulfilled if exceeds 1/2. Moving towards autarky (nt 0→α ) means the 
restriction is approaching unity so the restriction in fact reflects that  is at least in the limit 
as the first nature disadvantage disappears because there is no trade. More openness through 
higher 
nt st
α  and more equal trade costs through higher τ  therefore act as substitutes in the 




We will also need to know how 1/3τ  is affected by a marginal change in α  for fixed .  










⎡ ⎤−⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ = − − +⎢⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦
<⎥       (13) 
where we have substituted for equilibrium values for w and p and use the fact that the first 
and last term in the brackets are non-positive and  /p α−  is negative. Hence,  1/3τ  falls as 
α is increasing for fixed . nt
 
With the solutions at hand for both ‘policy on’ and ‘policy off’, we are in position to assess 




4. Policy performance 
 
The benefit b of the policy may be measured by the change in the population ratio. Under 
policy on the ratio is 1 and under policy off it is l, so b=1- l. With equal budget shares (the 
symmetric case), we know that , hence .  If we threat 3/1τ=l 3/11 τ−=b τ  as exogenous, we 
observe that if the transport cost asymmetry is increasing (τ  goes down) the gap to the target 
gets wider. This comes as no surprise. Moreover, the gap is entirely due to the transport cost 
asymmetry since there is no net effect of the vertical industry structure when budget shares 
are equal. The benefit is therefore entirely a first nature effect and we will take advantage of 
this when distinguishing between first and second nature in the general case.  
 
We do not pretend to do a full cost benefit analysis of the subsidy, but the fact that more 
limited cost criteria are often used in practice gives some justification for using the exchequer 
cost or financial cost (see, e.g., Holden and Swales, 1993), equal to ntc −=1 . If we express 
the benefit as a function of  under policy on, we have nt ( ) )1(21211 3/1 −=−−=−= nn ttb τ . 
The benefit cost ratio is therefore equal to 2)1/()1(2/ =−−= nn ttcb . This means that the gap 
to the policy target is closed by two percentage points for every percentage point the subsidy 
is  increased. This is the measure of policy performance. We may now turn to the general case 
with asymmetric budget shares allowing the vertical industry structure to affect the 
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equilibrium and ask what impact the presence of the second nature effect has on performance. 
Will a given subsidy close the gap to target more effectively? 
In the asymmetric case the benefit is ( ) )1(3/111 αβα
α
τ −−−=−= lb . This can be decomposed into 
a first nature benefit and a second nature benefit 






−+−= −− )1(3/13/13/11 αβα
α
τττb         (14) 
The first nature benefit is the gap to be closed whether the vertical linkage has an impact or 
not. It is caused by the transport cost asymmetry, the first nature difference, between North 
and South. We know from equation (13) that 1/3τ  increases as α falls for fixed , so 
openness as measured by the share of home made goods and services to imports has an impact 
on the first nature benefit. A falling 
nt
α means the ratio of home mades to imports becomes 
larger and this reduce the gap caused by the transport cost asymmetry.  
 
The second nature benefit is the gap that is present only when the vertical linkage has an 
impact on equilibrium. We know that the second nature effect always is positive for 1<α so 
second nature makes the benefit or gap between policy on and policy off larger. In order to 
assess how location of final demand affects the second nature benefit, we need 
( ) ( )
( )
(1/3 1/3 1/3(1 ) 2(1 ) (1 )ln / ln / ln(1 ) (1 )
α
α β α α α β α α )βτ α τ α
α β α α β α
− −
⎛ ⎞ − − − +
∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ +⎜ ⎟ − − − −⎝ ⎠
τ  (15) 
The first term is negative, the second positive. Say the first term in the expression for the 
second nature benefit ( 1/3τ ) falls with x percent when α falls. Then the first term in (15) tells 
us that the last term in the second nature expression falls with more than x percent since 
[ ]/ (1 )α α β α− − >1, and the last term in (15) just adds to that. Hence, the gap to target 
caused by second nature gets wider when the home market becomes more important. 
 
Let us now turn to the question of how location of final demand affects the total gap to target 
or the total benefit. Expanding both terms in (15) using (12) and (13) we get rid of the 
ambiguity and find that the sign is negative. Hence, the gap to target falls when α falls for 
fixed . In other words, the gap to the policy target is closed by less than two percentage 
points for every percentage point the subsidy is increased. However, this is due to a smaller 
first nature gap when the home market becomes more important. As we have seen, the second 





Reducing α from unity is making the home market more important at the same time as the 
vertical linkage comes into play. Hence, two things happen at the same time. Changing β  for 
fixed α is only affecting the second nature effect through the last term, perhaps giving a 
cleaner design for assessing the effect of second nature. The marginal effect on the last term, 
keeping α and fixed is given by nt ( ) ( ) ( )
1/3 1/3(1 )
2
(1 )ln / ln 0
(1 )
α




∂ ∂ =⎜ ⎟
− −⎝ ⎠
≤ . 
Hence, increasing β leads to an increase in the total benefit when 1<α , no effect on the first 
nature benefit and a bigger second nature benefit. We could of course also ask what the effect 
would be of lowering α and increasing β  at the same time compared to the symmetric 
benchmark case. Since the total effect of the first is to reduce the efficiency below two 
percentage points, we may wonder if the rise in β  would make the total benefit increase 
sufficiently to boost efficiency beyond the two percentage points. The answer to this 





We have presented a simple ‘new economic geography’ (NEG) model. It is NEG in the sense 
of being based on a complete microeconomic foundation and allowing a core-periphery 
structure to emerge endogenously (‘second nature’) in interaction with exogenous 
geographical asymmetry (‘first nature’). A considerable advantage over most other NEG 
models is that the model has simple closed form solutions and we do not need numerical 
simulation. This could make it suitable for rigorously presenting endogenous location in 
general equilibrium to a wider audience, in particular undergraduate students. Non-neutral 
space is introduced through a single parameter representing relative distance or transport cost 
asymmetry, more specifically the ratio of short distance to long distance costs. Neutral space 
is the limit case as the difference between the two disappears. Economic integration in NEG 
models is often represented by a uniform reduction in transport costs, but reduction in short 
distance to long distance transport costs seem in general to be more in accordance with 
realities (Hummels 1999). In the model this simply means a falling transport cost parameter. 
Another feature of the model presented, differentiating it from many other NEG models, is 
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that there are limits to concentration. As argued by Coppella (2007: p. 236), NEG models 
should be more realistic and allow limits to concentration through the theoretical structure of 
the model. 
 
Within this model we have done a policy analysis comparing a regional labour subsidy in the 
first nature periphery region financed through a regional labour tax in the core. The policy 
target has been to balance the disadvantage caused by transport cost asymmetry in order to 
obtain equal population in both regions. This policy is contrasted to laissez-faire. Allowing 
second nature effects, the gap to the policy target, or the policy benefit, for a fixed subsidy is 
increasing when the vertical industry structure in the model becomes stronger. Hence, second 
nature effects make policy more efficient. We have also seen that an increased share of home 
made goods makes policy more efficient. Stronger vertical linkages and less dependence on 
imports therefore seem to be favourable for policy performance. On the other hand, weaker 
vertical linkages and more openness not only reduce relative performance, but make the gap 
to the policy target smaller and therefore possibly reduce the incentives for any political 
interference in the first place.   
 
The model is suitable for analysis of more complex policies in more complex environments. 
Notably, tax rates may be differentiated between industries within the same region to capture 
the fact that international agreements are more restrictive to directly subsidizing traded goods 
than non-traded goods. The policy alternative could then be to abandon the subsidy 
downstream and maintain it upstream. Another possible extension of interest is to allow for 
differences in labour mobility between different types of labour and between mobility in the 
short and the long run. We may even envisage location analysis when labour markets are not 









Consumers have identical Cobb-Douglas preferences regardless of occupation and location of residence. 
Everybody supplies one unit of labour, receiving vj/tjA and wj/tjB depending on skills. The producer wage rate in 
sector A upstream is vj and in the B sector downstream wj, whereas tjA and tjB are the payroll tax factors. 
Individual expenditure systems for A skilled and B skilled are  
/ ,
/ , , , , .
hA
ij ij ij j jA
hB
ij ij ij j jB
p y v t





        (A.1) 
 
A.2. The downstream economic base sector 
 
The economic base sector in a specific region consists of a large number of  firms with identical constant returns 
to scale technology. Aggregate output is determined by assuming that profits are zero due to free entry and exit. 
Skipping indices for region in the rest of the appendix, the unit cost function for a firm is written 
( )ln / ln ln , 1.w q w qc y w qβ β β β= + + =
l z
        (A.2) 
Here, w is the wage rate paid by producers, q is a price index of inputs from the non-basic sector, c/y is unit cost, 
and the Greek letters again parameters. The primal of (A.2) is Cobb-Douglas, 









−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
∑ 1,>           (A.3) 
where qk is the price paid for input k, and σ  is the elasticity of substitution between any pair of inputs. Using 
(A.3), I assume a finite number of inputs so large that the integer constraint is not binding. Defining z as a 











∑ .  
This technology has several well known attractive properties: a) The cost function is separable in w and q, b) 
costs decrease when the number of inputs from the non-basic sector increases, and c) no input from the non-
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basic sector is essential. Property a) implies that the cost minimising firm may proceed in two steps: First, it may 
choose how much labour, l, and aggregate input, z, to use conditional on any output level, y. Second, conditional 
on the optimal level of z, it may choose how much to use of the different inputs from the non-basic sector, zk. 
Property b) means that increased specialisation in the non-basic sector rather than subdivision of labour within a 
single firm, raises productivity.4 Property c) implies that the degree of specialisation within any region is 
endogenous.  
 











           (A.4) 
Hence, the ratio of the wage bill to the cost of intermediates, , is constant and equal to /wl qz /w q .β β  The 
larger qβ  is, the more important are intermediates for production costs in the basic sector and the stronger is the 
effect of increased specialisation in the non-basic sector.  
 
From (A.3) we obtain sub cost shares  
1/ ( / )k k kq z q q q k
σ−= ∀
)
.         (A.5) 
We may write (A.5) as (ln ln lnk kz q qσ− = −  for any k, including k=s. Differentiating logarithmically w.r.t. 















                                                          
         (A.6) 
When specialisation increases, the sub cost share for input s goes to zero and the demand elasticity is simply 
equal to the elasticity of substitution.  
4 This point has perhaps been emphasised most succinctly  in the regional context by Nicholas Kaldor (1970, p. 
340):  
“To explain why certain regions have become highly industrialised, while others have not we must introduce 
quite different kinds of considerations – what Myrdal (1957) called the principle of ‘circular and cumulative 
causation’. This is nothing else but the existence of increasing returns to scale – using that term in the broadest 
sense – in processing activities. These are not just the economies of large-scale production, commonly 
considered, but the cumulative advantages accruing from the growth of industry itself – the development of skill 
and know-how; the opportunities for easy communication of ideas and experience; the opportunity of ever-
increasing differentiation of processes and of specialisation in human activities. As Allyn Young (1928) pointed 
out in a famous paper, Adam Smith’s principle of the ‘division of labour’ operates through the constant sub-
division of industries, the emergence of new kinds of specialised firms, of steadily increasing differentiation – 
more than through the expansion in the size of the individual plant or the individual firm.” 
14  
  
A.3. The upstream non-basic sector 
 
The non-basic sector, the A sector, is also assumed to consist of firms with identical technology, but this time 
increasing returns to scale internal to the firms because of set up costs. The cost function for firm k is written,  
1 0(k kb z )vς ς= +            (A.7) 
Here, bk is total costs and v is the producer wage rate prevailing in the non-basic sector. The primal to (A.7) is  
0( ) /k kz m 1ς ς= − , where mk is labour input. Marginal cost is 1vς and the set up cost is 0vς . With internal 
economies of scale, there must be some kind of imperfect competition to obtain market equilibrium. Following 
most of the literature in the new economic geography tradition, let us assume that market structure is 
monopolistic competition. The first order condition for profit maximising is  
( ) 11 1/k kq vε ς− = .          (A.8) 
Assuming specialisation is sufficient to substitute σ  for kε  (cf. eq. (A.6)), the profit maximising price for each 






.           (A.9) 
Monopolistic competition implies that profits vanish in equilibrium, 
0k k kq z b− = .           (A.10) 
Since there are no profits, only labour input and intermediates are non-tradable, we note that the cost of 
intermediates for the basic sector is equal to the wage bill for the non-basic sector, qz vm= . By (A.4),  
/ /qvm wl wβ β=            (A.11) 
as claimed in Appendix B. 
Substituting for  from (A.9) and bkq k from (A.7), we obtain the equilibrium output, 
0 ( 1) /kz 1ς σ= − ς ,          (A.12) 
and labour input, 
0km ς σ= .           (A.13) 
Full employment means that 
0m nς σ=            (A.14) 
where n is the number of firms. Since B sector productivity rises when the number of intermediate inputs rise 
and there is internal economies of scale, the number of firms is also equal to the number of products since it is 
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σ ς σ σ
⎛ ⎞ ⎛= +⎜ ⎟ ⎜− −⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎞
⎟          (A.15) 
 In order to simplify, different normalisations are suggested in the literature. We could, e.g., set 0ς and 1ς  in 
such a way that 1 01/ 1 1ς ς σ≡ − ≡ − , and write 
, 1/ ,k k kq v z m 1σ σ= = =          (A.16) 
This means that we can use m for the number of intermediate inputs. Although this kind of normalisations may 
prove useful for specific purposes, we should be aware that a change in σ implies an automatic change in the 
cost parameters.5
 
A.4. Mill prices 
 
With free entry, mill prices are just sufficient to cover unit production costs in equilibrium, 
ln ln lnw qp w qβ β= +           (A.17) 
Substituting for ln  from (A.15), using (A.11), we may express the mill price as a function of the B sector 
producer wage rate and labour inputs, 
q
ln ln ln ln ln
1q q q
p w l mσβ β β
σ
= + + +
−
z         (A.18) 
where, 
( ) 0 1





βσ σ σ ς ς
1σ σ β
⎛ ⎞
= − − − + + ⎜⎜− − ⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟−
      (A.19) 
as claimed in Appendix B. If we impose the normalizations given by (A.16), the expression simplifies to 








= − − + ⎜⎜− −⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟
                                                          
        (A.20) 






Appendix B: the macroeconomic model 
 
B.1 The general equilibrium model 
 
The model can be summarised in some simple, intuitive equations. The two equations given by (1) below imply 
that supply equals domestic and foreign demand for final goods produced in all the regions. Here ri represents 
aggregate income in region i, sij is the aggregate expenditure share for the good produced in region i and 
consumed in region j, and ti is the tax factor in region i  (if pt is the payroll tax rate, 1+pt is defined as the 
payroll tax factor).  
( ) , ; ,i i ii j ij u iur t s r s r s i j i j n s− = + ≠ = ,
iu
i ui
  (B.1) 
The market clearing condition for products made in the outside region u, is not included since adding up implies 
that only two of the three equations are independent. This is a statement of Walras’ law, which basically always 
is true because of the budget constraints on the market behaviour of each individual. We may also note that 
imposing market clearing is equivalent to imposing interregional trade equilibrium. There will be balance of 
payments between the regions, or to paraphrase John Stuart Mill: the produce of a region exchanges for the 
produce of other regions, at such values as are required in order that the whole of her exports, and net transfers, 
may exactly pay for the whole of her imports. This is easily seen, by observing that (B.1) can be written as  
. The right side is here net transfers plus ‘the whole of her exports’. By definition, 
, so  where the right side is ‘the whole of her imports’, hence equation (B.1) 
implies that exports net of transfers equal imports.  
(1 )i ii i j ij ur s r pt r s r s− = − + +
i i j
j
r r s= ∑ (1 )i ii i ji ir s r s r s− = +
 
In order to preserve a constant tax burden when comparing different tax regimes (as we should do according to 
the widely accepted methodology for comparative studies of tax systems, see, e.g., Hamilton, 1999), without 
introducing additional taxes in the model, we must have  
(1 ) ( 1)n n s sr t r t− = −   (B.2) 
Subsidies mean that the payroll tax factor is below unity in the assisted region and/or sector, and above unity in 
the non-assisted area and/or sector. Here, region s is paying for some of the imports to region n through the 
transfer in form of labour subsidies, so   and 1st > 1nt < . The tax factor is normalized to unity in region u. The 
‘policy on’ alternative discussed in the main text is obtained by setting 
, ,nA nB n sA sB s uA uBt t t t t t t t= ≡ = ≡ = ≡1.
1nB nA n sA sB nB s uA uBt t t t t t t t t≠ ≡ = = ≡ = ≡
  (B.3) 
Subscript A and B refer to sector specific factors so the model allows a discussion where the tax rate is 
differentiated across sectors as well as regions although only regional specificity is discussed in the main text.  
An alternative could, e.g., be 
, , .   (B.4) 




Let us now turn to the demand structure of the model. Consider the Cobb-Douglas aggregate demand system, 
, , , , .ij ijij ij
j
p y
s i j n s u
r
α≡ = =   (B.5) 
Greek letters are parameters, pij is delivered price in region j for the good produced in region i,  yij is quantity of 
the good. For the expenditure shares to add up, we must impose the restrictions 1ij
i
α =∑ . To simplify, we 
assume homogeneous consumers in the sense that everybody is using the same expenditure share on home 
mades,  , , ,ii H i n s uα α= = , and the same on imports from either source, , ; , , ,ij F i j i j n s uα α= ≠ = . For adding 
up to hold, this means that 1 2H Fα α= − . We restrict the discussion to H Fα α≥ . When adding up holds, this 
means that 1/ 3Fα ≤ .  
 
Since labour is the only input and there is zero profit in equilibrium in the markets for intermediates, it is shown 
in Appendix A that 
/i i q i i wv m w l /β β=   (B.6) 






= = ,s u   (B.7) 
The producer wage rate and employment in sector A is vi and mi - in the B sector wi and li. The cost share for B 
skilled labour is wβ , and for intermediates in the production of final goods, qβ . The inverse of the tax factor in 
any region is the weighted average for the two sectors with wβ  and qβ  as weights,1 / / /i q iA w it t Btβ β= + . 
Hence, the right side of (B.7) gives us the income distribution since income earned by A-skilled is equal to 
( / ) /i i w q iAw l tβ β ,and by B-skilled, ( / ) /i i w w iBw l tβ β .  
 
What about the labour markets and mobility? I have assumed that everybody supplies one unit of labour, that 
they are either A skilled or B skilled and that they cannot be retrained. The number of B skilled people in region 
u is fixed and equal to ul . So is the number of A skilled in region u, equal to um . Region n and s share a 
common pool of potential mobile A skilled and B skilled workers, m  and l . We must have:  
, , ,u u u u n s n sm m l l m m m l l l≤ ≤ + ≤ + ≤   (B.8) 
We assume that all labour markets clear so that we have full employment, i.e., all the restrictions given by (B.8) 
are effective. 
 
When we allow mobility, mobile workers locate wherever the real wages are highest. In full spatial equilibrium, 
real wages in both sectors in region n and s are equal. There is mobility equilibrium for A skilled labour if  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ln / ln / ln / ln / ln /n nA n n s s s s n sw t l m w t l m cpi cpi+ = + +  (B.9) 
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where , denote the regional consumer price indices. ,jcpi j n s= ,
)
There is mobility equilibrium for B skilled labour if  
( ) ( ) (ln / ln / ln /n nB s s n sw t w t cpi cpi= +   (B.10) 
Under the ‘policy on’ regime, (B.10) is the same restriction as (B.9). Hence, one instrument (the tax factor in n) 
is sufficient to obtain desired levels for the target variables, mn and ln.  
Three alternative model specifications concerning labour mobility could be considered: 
i Full mobility. Restriction (B.9) and (B.10) are imposed.  
ii Partial mobility (mobility in the A sector only). Restriction (B.9) is still valid, but now (B.8) should be 
extended, imposing the restrictions nl ln=  and s sl l= .  
iii No mobility. Now neither (B.9) nor (B.10) is valid, and to the list of restrictions under case ii, we must add 
nm m= n  and s sm m= . 
Only the first alternative is discussed in the main text. 
 





cpi p=∏   (B.11) 
Delivered prices are in general different from mill prices because of transport costs. I assume only  units 
arrive when 
ijy
ij ijyτ  units are shipped. Hence, ijτ represent transport costs.
6 The relationship between delivered 
prices and mill prices are 
, , , ,ij ij ip p i j n s uτ= =    (B.12) 
In order to simplify, we will throughout assume symmetrical transport costs, ,ij jiτ τ= that transport costs 
between region s and the two other regions are equal and smaller than between n and u, L nu su ns Sτ τ τ τ τ≡ > = ≡ , 
and ignore domestic distribution costs, 1iiτ = . It is convenient to denote /S Lτ τ  by τ . In order to close the 
model, we must determine mill prices. The mill prices can be obtained using 
( )/ (1 ) , , ,qi i i ip w l m z i n s u
βσ σ−= =    (B.13) 
where the factor  depends on a vector of parameters shared by all regions (on the assumption of identical 
technology). The vector of parameters consist of the cost share for intermediates (
z
qβ ), the elasticity of 
substitution between any variants of intermediates (σ ), and the marginal ( 1ς ) and fixed ( 0ς ) cost per money 
                                                          
6 This is the approach favoured in the new economic geography literature in order to avoid introducing a 
separate transport sector in the models. Many transport economists would probably not be happy to learn that 
their subject has been swept under the carpet. At this point there is a large potential to enrich the model. 
Transport costs depend on more than distance: transport infrastructure quality, substitution possibilities between 
different transport modes, input prices, logistics and thickness of transport markets. Unfortunately, the results of 
the simpler model may not survive alternative specifications of transport technology. Neary (2001) refers to 
older trade theory literature attempting to model an explicit transportation sector: “That approach never led to 
simple or easily summarizable results, and is now largely forgotten. Perhaps it is due a revival.” (p.550) 
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wage unit in the production of intermediates (the notation refers to the notation used in the Appendix A where 
the details leading to (B.13) are found). Alternatively, accepting the normalization given by (A.16), the factor  
depends on only two parameters: 
z
qβ and σ . 
 
B.2 A six-equation summary  
 
Expressed in terms of the basic sector producer wage rate, the model presented in the previous Section may be 
summarized by the following equation system, 
1 qn n w s s FH u F
w nA nB w s







− + = +⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ β
       (B.14) 
( ) qs s n n F ws H
w s w nA nB




u Frα αβ β
⎛ ⎞
− = + +⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
       (B.15) 





β β⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞
+ − = −⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟
⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
)1       (B.16) 
n n s s n
n nA s s s
w l w l cpi
m t m t cpi











n n n n
s s s s
cpi w l m
cpi w l m
α αβ σβ σα
τ
−−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎜= ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎟
⎟
      (B.19) 
Equation (B.14) and (B.15) are the market clearing conditions for products made in region n and s, 
corresponding to (B.1). (B.16) corresponds to (B.2), the restriction that tax revenues should be kept constant. 
(B.17) and (B.18) are the mobility equilibrium conditions, corresponding to (B.9) and (B.10) (to go from (B.9) 
to (B.17), use (A.11) in Appendix A). Equation (B.19) is obtained by plain substitution. 
 
Under the ‘policy on’ regime discussed in the main text we have that nA nB nt t t= =  and the policy instrument, , 
is used to obtain a desired level for employment in the basic sector in the periphery, say the symmetric 
distribution 
nt
/ 2n sl l l= = . Then, for (B.17) and (B.18) to hold, employment in the non basic sector must be 
given by / 2n sm m m= = , and total population equally distributed, so we do indeed have a symmetrical  
outcome. With symmetry imposed, (B.17) is identical to (B.18), so we may ignore (B.17). If we concentrate on 
the relative producer wage rate between n and s,  we may use (B.14) and (B.15) to cancel out the term related to 
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region u. We are then left with the four equations presented as the model (5)-(8) in the main text (with some 
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